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Abstract
Mathematics and its relation to the physical universe have been the topic
of speculation since the days of Pythagoras. Several different views of the
nature of mathematics have been considered: Realism - mathematics exists
and is discovered; Logicism - all mathematics may be deduced through pure
logic; Formalism: mathematics is just the manipulation of formulas and rules
invented for the purpose; Intuitionism: mathematics comprises mental con-
structs governed by self evident rules. The debate among the several schools
has major importance in understanding what Eugene Wigner called, “The Un-
reasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.” In return,
this ‘Unreasonable Effectiveness’ suggests a possible resolution of the debate in
favor of Realism. The crucial element is the extraordinary predictive capacity
of mathematical structures descriptive of physical theories.1
PACS: 0170w *43.10.10Mq
1 Introduction
In an essay which appeared in his collection, Symmetries and Reflections , Wigner [1]
explored the connection between mathematics and science. He wondered that,
1It is a pleasure to dedicate this paper to Josh Goldberg, long a valued member of the community
of Generl Relativists and a good friend.
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“. . .the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is
something bordering on the mysterious and that there is no rational ex-
planation for this.”
And, later,
“. . . the mathematical formulation of the physicist’s often crude experience
leads in an uncanny number of cases to an amazingly accurate description
of a large class of phenomena.”
A similar view was expressed by Bochner2 [2]
“What makes mathematics so effective when it enters science is a mystery
of mysteries and the present book wants to achieve no more than explicate
how deep this mystery is.”
And again, in Chapter 22 of the London Philosophical Study Guide [3].
“Mathematical reality is in itself mysterious: how can it be highly abstract
and yet applicable to the physical world? How can mathematical theorems
be necessary truths about an unchanging realm of abstract entities and
at the same time so useful in dealing with the contingent, variable and
inexact happenings evident to the senses?”
None mention the central mystery, which is the ability of an appropriate formu-
lation to predict phenomena yet undiscovered. Indeed, as often noted, the principal
problem in progress in physics is to find this formulation. It is our purpose to explore
this “mysterious” relation between physical theories and their mathematical formu-
lation and suggest an answer. Firstly an understanding of mathematics is essential.
2 Mathematics
Mathematics arose from that most fundamental of mathematical activities - counting
objects. In the most ancient of times, a person might enumerate objects of the same
kind - say goats or sheaves of wheat and if he wanted to record the results, would
have to invent a system of symbols to identify and differentiate two quantites. We
can be sure that he would use the same symbol system to record different quantities
2It is noteworthy that Wigner was a Nobel Laureate in physics and Bochner, a distinguished
mathematician. The talent for the two skills does not seem to be the same. Only a few gifted
individuals such as Archimedes, Newton, or Gauss had supreme talents in both. This difference in
talents can be observed in college upperclassmen. Expert knowledge and superior skill in the use of
mathematics is the hallmark of the gifted physicist.
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of apples. He would quickly learn to add two collections of objects. This could well
have happened anywhere groups of people progressed beyond being hunter-gatherers.
This simple skill evolved to the sophisticated arithmetic of the Babylonians [4].
They exhibited great ingenuity in their ability to use tables of squares to solve various
arithmetic problems and could solve quadratic and cubic equations. Similarly, a direct
descent for spatial relations can be discerned. The Pharaonic Egyptians devised an
elementary geometry for purposes of resurveying fields after the recession of the annual
Nile floodwaters. This skill was elaborated to the extent that construction of temples
and pyramids became possible. To accomplish all this, a unit of length was defined. In
this way geometry was conflated with arithmetic. Despite their achievements, neither
the Babylonians nor the Egyptians considered their mathematics to be more than a
computational scheme. Their mathematics was devoted primarily to mensuration,
computing taxes, keeping accounts and making astronomical calculations. They had
no concepts of theorems or proofs. This was left to the Greeks.
The genius of the Greeks, beginning with the Pythagorean school was to discern an
abstract coherent structure beneath the arithmetic of the Babylonians and Egyptians.
They introduced the concept of theorem and proof . In this way, from the simple act
of counting and the drawing of geometric figures, an elaborate system of mathematics
was constructed in Classical Greece.
The Pythagoreans [5] left no written record of their accomplishments. These are
known largely through the writings of later Greek philosophers [6]. They were besot-
ted with number per se effectively founding number theory. But, it was their belief in
the esoteric character of mathematics and its relation to the physical universe which
is of interest here. They believed that all that could be known of the physical universe
would be known through number. Of the Pythagoreans, Aristotle commented [7],
“Contemporaneously with these philosophers and before them, the so-
called Pythagoreans, who were the first to take up mathematics, not only
advanced this study, but also having been brought up in it they thought
its principles were the principles of all things. Since of these principles
numbers are by nature the first, and in numbers they seemed to see many
resemblances to the things that be modeled on numbers, and numbers
seemed to be the first things in the whole of nature, they supposed the
elements of numbers to be the elements of all things, and they exist and
come into being - more than in fire and earth and water . . . all other things
seemed in their whole nature to hold heaven to be a musical scale and a
number.”
Many centuries later, Galileo [8] put it more precisely (and famously).
“Philosophy is written in this grand book–I mean the universe–which
stands continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless
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one first learns to comprehend the language and interpret the characters
in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and
its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without
which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without
these, one is wandering around in a dark labyrinth.”
Whether his view is Pythagorean, that is, does he imply an identity between the mode
of description and the object described or that the mode and object are distinct, is
not clear.
A similar sentiment, with clearer distinction, was expressed some three centuries
later by Weyl [9] in connection with the “language” appropriate for application to
gravitation theory.
“As everyone has to work hard learning language and writing before he
can use them freely for expressing his thoughts, so here too the only way to
shift the load of formulas from one’s own shoulders is to be well acquainted
with tensor analysis so that one can turn unimpeded by formalities to the
true problems: Insight into the nature of space, time and matter insofar
as they contribute to the construction of the objective reality.”
3 Nature of Mathematics
For the scientist, mathematics is a tool; for the mathematician, it is an end in itself;
for the philosopher, the philosophy of mathematics is, as Ko¨rner [10] puts it,
“... not mathematics. It is a reflection on mathematics.”
The nature of mathematics has been debated by philosophers3 beginning with the
Pythagoreans. They considered numbers to be inextricably connected with the phys-
ical world. Plato refined Pythagorean ideas to a scheme of ideal abstract structures
mirrored in the immediate world as discovered through human activity. Subsequent
modifications led to Realism in which the severe concept of ideals is modified. Sim-
ply put, mathematical structures have an independent existence and are uncovered
by observation and ratiocination. This view has been held by many mathematicians
such as Paul Erdo¨s who often referred to an imaginary “Book” in which God had
written down all the “beautiful” mathematical proofs. This was expressed more
picturesquely by Everett [12]
3For a concise introduction and useful bibliography, see the Wikipedia article, “The Philosophy
of Mathematics”. For a detailed introduction and discussion, consult Ko¨rner’s [11]“The Philosophy
of Mathematics”.
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“In the pure mathematics we contemplate absolute truths which existed
in the divine mind before the morning stars sang together, and which will
continue to exist there when the last of their host shall have fallen from
heaven.”
A more temperate exposition of the same view was expressed by the distinguished
British mathematician, Hardy [13],
“I have myself always thought of a mathematician in the first instance as
an observer, who gazes at a distant range of mountains and writes down
his observations.”
In the late 19th Century, a radically new approach by Frege [14], subsequently
termed Logicism claimed that all mathematics was just a logical structure.
“Arithmetic thus becomes simply a development of logic, and every propo-
sition of arithmetic a law of logic albeit a derivative one. To apply arith-
metic in the physical sciences is to bring logic to bear on observed facts;
calculation becomes deduction. The laws of number will not, . . ., need
to stand up to practical tests if they are to be applicable to the external
world; for in the external world, in the whole of space and all that therein
is, there are no concepts, no properties of concepts, no numbers. The laws
of number, therefore, are not really applicable to external things; they are
not laws of nature.”
A modified view was earlier given by Kronecker [15].
“God created the numbers, all the rest is the work of man.”
This avoids the extreme difficulty of establishing the system of numbers by purely
logical arguments encountered later by Whitehead and Russell in their Principia
Mathematica [16]. They do not establish that 1 + 1 = 2 until page 362 of Volume 1.
The concept of Formalism is due to Hilbert who described it simply as4 [17].
“Mathematics is a game played according to certain simple rules with
meaningless marks on paper.”
Wigner, early in his essay, in the section titled What is Mathematics? , provides the
same view of mathematics.
“. . . mathematics is the science of skillful operations with concepts and
rules invented for just this purpose.”
4Though widely quoted, the attribution of this comment to Hilbert is apocryphal.
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Intuitionism, created by the Dutch mathematician Brouwer [18], proposes that
mathematical objects are mental constructions governed by self-evident laws.
In a class by itself is the school of thought that considers the brain to have been
hard-wired with the number concept at birth5
The various schools of thought have enabled intense debates among philosophers
of science and mathematics. However, a conclusive argument strongly in favor of
Realism can be constructed out the interaction of mathematics and physics, This will
be described below.
4 The Practice of Physics
The physicist attempts to understand physical universe. The endeavor is enormously
facilitated through employment of Galileo’s “language of mathematics”. The use of
mathematics entails representing each physical entity of interest with a mathematical
object. This is done by mapping these entities uniquely onto a mathematical concept.
A velocity is a polar vector; a moment is an axial vector; time is a one-dimensional
manifold; flat space-time is a four-dimensional manifold with a Minkowski metric.
The process is a species of conceptual isomorphism. It can’t be a homeomorphism if
ambiguity is to be avoided. Once this mapping has been completed, the mathematics
takes over completely; it has a life of its own. The rules of the particular mathematical
structure govern. There is no longer any physics per se. At the end of the calculation,
the results are mapped back onto the physical universe.
At intermediate steps it should be possible to map the mathematics back onto the
physics. That is, it should be possible to interpret every mathematical symbol with
a physical construct. Dirac [20] expressed it this way,
“The new scheme [the representation of quantum states and variables]
becomes a precise physical theory when all the axioms and rules of ma-
nipulation governing the mathematical quantities are specified and when
in addition certain laws are laid down connecting physical facts with the
mathematical formalism, so that from any given physical conditions equa-
tions between the mathematical quantities may be inferred and vice versa.
In an application of the theory one would be given certain physical infor-
mation, which one would proceed to express by equations between the
mathematical quantities. One would then deduce new equations with
the help of the axioms and rules of manipulation and would conclude by
interpreting these new equations as physical conditions.”
5For an example of this approach see Dahaene [19].
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The “Unreasonable Effectiveness” is two-fold. Firstly, there is the incredible
richness of phenomena which can be accurately described by a mathematical struc-
ture. Maxwell’s equations furnish the means to accurately describe electromagnetic
phenomena from power transformers to radio transmission. Einstein’s equations of
general relativity provide the basis for calculating gravitational phenomena from re-
markably accurate solar system ephemerides to the gravitational radiation from pul-
sar PSR1913+16. The wealth of accurate description of atomic phenomena by the
Schro¨dinger equation needs no elaboration. This brief list could be extended dramat-
ically.
Secondly, and of decisive importance, the mathematics may describe phenomena
completely unforeseen when the problem was originally formulated. think of the Dirac
equation for the electron. What Dirac [21] said about it later is precisely to the point.
“It was found that this equation gave the particle a spin of half a quantum.
And also gave it a magnetic moment. It gave just the properties that one
needed for an electron. That was really an unexpected bonus for me,
completely unexpected.”
[Emphasis added] What he did not know at the time he published the equation
[1927] was that, quite remarkably, it also described the positron which had yet to be
discovered [1932].
The Schwarzschild singularity in the solution of the Einstein equations for an
isolated point mass is another example. So was the yet to be observed radio waves
in Maxwell’s equations. Physics is full of these surprises. A less well known far
more simple example is that of the exact solution of the simple pendulum. This is an
elliptic integral [22], the real value of which corresponds to the given initial conditions.
The imaginary period corresponds to a reversed gravitational field and an initial
displacement of the bob which is supplementary to that in the original problem.
The latter is an example of the principle that every prediction of a mathematical
formulation of a physical has a “real” significance.
5 Reflections
The practice of physics is based on the concept that the physical universe, locally and
globally, evolves in accordance with fixed rules. This is attested to by the consistent
ability of independent observers to replicate each others results. It is this regularity
which admits the use of mathematics to describe these results.
All of mathematics starts from a set of integers used for counting. The historical
record shows that the ability to count evolved in different areas independently. The
Babylonian and Mayan civilizations, among others, developed this skill. Contrarily,
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some cultures developed counting no further than ”one, two, many.” This suggests
an objective independence of the integers and that they were discovered rather than
created or, as suggested, that the number concept is hard-wired in the brain [19].
Further, evidence provided by astrophysical observations implies that the laws of
physics are invariant with respect to location and independent of era. This implies
that the mathematical models created by extraterrestrials (if such exist) are identical,
modulo symbology, to those here on earth. In turn, these imply the universal common
existence of mathematics.
It was noted earlier that the relation between mathematics and physical phenom-
ena is a species of isomorphism. The phenomena is mapped uniquely onto a math-
ematical structure and then mapped in the reverse direction. The extent to which
the initial choice of mathematical structure is an accurate mapping is determined by
how well the evolving physical phenomena remains isomorphic to the mathematics
The relationship between mathematics and phenomena is reciprocal; each is a repre-
sentation of the other. It is in this sense that mathematics has an objective reality.
The problem of the physicist is to find that representation.
The identification of mathematics as objectively existent entails an interesting
problem. Hawking [23] has noted that mathematical structures are subject to the
incompleteness theorems of Go¨del:
“... we and our models are both part of the universe we are describing.
Thus a physical theory is self referencing, ... . One might therefore expect
it to be either inconsistent or incomplete. ... The theories we have so far
are both inconsistent and incomplete.”
This is certainly correct but only of theoretical interest. There has yet to constructed
mathematical models which are precisely descriptive of the phenomena we do observe.
Despite an incredible accuracy of ten parts in a billion, the present formulation of
quantum electrodynamics is notoriously lacking in rigor [24]; the “standard model”,
however accurate its predictions, is substantially more a protocol than a theory; a
quantized version of the theory of general relativity has yet to be found. In brief, there
is nothing yet in the mathematical models of observed physical phenomena to which
Go¨del’s theorems might be applied. Moreover, our theories are certainly incomplete
and will always remain so. With respect to the cosmos this is obvious. The strictures
imposed by the principle of special relativity limits what information we can collect
to the interior of the past light-cone. That is finite in extent, some 13+ billion years
at the present time. The best that a physicist may hope for is a model which is both
a) accurate in description b) possessed of predictive capability and c) mathematically
rigorous. While the success of (a) and (b) have been substantial, this is not the case
for (c). The approach to a final, mathematically rigorous “theory of everything” is
at best, asymptotic. Thus, for the finite future, Go¨del’s theorem is not a problem.
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Physicists do not (with rare exception such as Newton’s fluxions, the aforemen-
tioned Dirac delta function, or Heaviside’s operational calculus) create any of the
mathematics they utilize. The elaboration of existing and discovery of new mathe-
matics is mostly the province of mathematicians. We thus have a very large apparatus
of which only part is presently used by physicists. This suggested the question [25],
“Does any piece of mathematics exist for which there is no application whatsoever in
physics?” The question has been addressed several times, most recently in 2001 [26]
[27]. The answers were uniformly no. This, though suggestive, is not conclusive.
If either Formalism or Constructivism were accurate characterizations of mathe-
matics then every mathematician could construct his own universe. There could be as
many different universes as there were mathematicians engaged in the enterprise. The
consequences of this are not easily described. The decisive evidence that Realism is
the proper characterization is the predictive capability of the mathematical structures
in which physical theories are couched. This strongly infers that mathematics and
the reality it describes are both part of the objective universe and await discovery.
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